Abstract. Tse and Zdancewic have formalized the notion of noninterference for Abadi et al.'s DCC in terms of logical relations and given a proof of noninterference by reduction to parametricity of System F. Unfortunately, their proof contains errors in a key lemma that their translation from DCC to System F preserves the logical relations defined for both calculi. In fact, we have found a counterexample for it. In this article, instead of DCC, we prove noninterference for sealing calculus, a new variant of DCC, by reduction to the basic lemma of a logical relation for the simply typed λ-calculus, using a fully complete translation to the simply typed λ-calculus. Full completeness plays an important role in showing preservation of the two logical relations through the translation. Also, we investigate relationship among sealing calculus, DCC, and an extension of DCC by Tse and Zdancewic and show that the first and the last of the three are equivalent.
Introduction
Background. Dependency analysis is a family of static program analyses to trace dependencies between inputs and outputs of a given program. For example, information flow analysis [3] , binding-time analysis [8] , and call tracking [20] are its instances. One of the most important correctness criteria of the dependency analysis is called noninterference [5] , which roughly means that, for any pair of program inputs that are equivalent from the viewpoint of an observer at some dependency level (e.g., security level, binding-time), the outputs are also equivalent for the observer. Various techniques for type-based dependency analyses have been proposed, especially, in the context of language-based security [18] .
Abadi et al. proposed a unifying framework called dependency core calculus (DCC) [1] for type-based dependency analyses for higher-order functional languages, and gave it a denotational model whose idea comes from parametricity [17, 24] of System F [16, 4] through other information flow analyses [7, 11] . They showed noninterference for several type systems of concrete dependency analyses by embedding them into DCC. Recently, Tse and Zdancewic [21, 22, 23] studied the relationship between DCC and System F. First, they formalized the noninterference property for recursion-free DCC by using a syntactic logical relation [9] -a family of type-indexed relations, defined by induction on types, over programs-as the equivalence relations for inputs and outputs, thereby generalizing the notion of noninterference to higher-order inputs and outputs. Then, they gave a proof of noninterference by reducing it to the parametricity theorem, which was also formalized in terms of syntactic logical relations, of System F. Their technical development is summarized as follows:
(1) Define a translation F from DCC to System F; (2) Prove, by induction on the structure of types, that the translation is both sound and complete-that is, it preserves the logical relations in the sense that e 1 ≈ D e 2 : t ⇐⇒ F(e 1 ) ≈ F F(e 2 ) :
where t is a DCC type, and ≈ D and ≈ F represent the logical relations for DCC and System F, respectively; and (3) Prove noninterference by reduction to the parametricity theorem of System F, using the sound and complete translation above. Unfortunately, in the second step, their proof [21, 22, 23] contains an error 1 , which we will briefly explain here. Note first that, for function types t 1 → t 2 , the logical relations are defined by: e 1 ≈ x e 2 : t 1 → t 2 if and only if e 1 e ′ 1 ≈ x e 2 e ′ 2 : t 2 for any e ′ 1 ≈ x e ′ 2 : t 1 (x stands for either D or F ) and that the type translation is homomorphic for function types, namely F(t 1 → t 2 ) = F(t 1 ) → F(t 2 ). Then, consider the case where t is a function type t 1 → t 2 . To show the left-to-right direction, we must show that F(e 1 ) M 1 ≈ F F(e 2 ) M 2 : F(t 2 ) for any M 1 ≈ F M 2 : F(t 1 ), from the assumption e 1 ≈ D e 2 : t 1 → t 2 , but we get stuck because there is no applicable induction hypothesis. If there existed a DCC term e such that F(e) = M for any System F term M of type F(t)-in this case, we say a translation is full [6] then M 1 and M 2 would be of the forms F(e ′ 1 ) and F(e ′ 2 ), making it possible to apply an induction hypothesis, and the whole proof would go through. Their translation, however, turns out not to be full; we have actually found a counterexample for the preservation of the equivalence from the failure of the fullness (see Section 6 for more details). So, although interesting, this indirect proof method fails at least for the combination of DCC and System F. Note that the noninterference property itself could be proved directly by induction on DCC typing.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we prove noninterference by Tse and Zdancewic's method in a slightly different setting: In order to obtain a fully complete translation, we change the source language to a richer one, what we call Sealing Calculus (λ [ ] ), and use a simpler target language, namely the simply typed λ-calculus λ → . Then, the basic lemma for logical relations of λ → is used in place of the parametricity theorem.
λ [ ] is a simply typed λ-calculus with the notion of sealing and a simplification of a security calculus which Tse and Zdancewic proposed as an extension of DCC (we call it DCC pc throughout this paper) [21, 22, 23] . A λ [ ] term [e] ℓ stands for sealing e with a level ℓ, which is a degree of confidentiality of the sealed data. The sealed data can be extracted by unsealing e ℓ . For example, let v a sealed boolean value, then ([v] ℓ ) ℓ is evaluated to v. We control unsealing operations by a type system so that only users with relevant authority can unseal. In the type system, e.g., we assign a sealing type [bool] ℓ to [v] ℓ for any user, but, ([v] ℓ ) ℓ has type bool only for authorized users. To take such a notion of "authorized users" into account, a type judgment is augmented with information about authority.
Then, we define a translation of λ [ ] to λ → in the same way as Tse-Zdancewic's translation of DCC [21, 22, 23] : we encode [v] ℓ and its type [bool] ℓ by λ-abstraction λk : α ℓ . v and function type α ℓ → bool, respectively, where α ℓ is a type variable. Intuitively, a term K of type α ℓ , if exists, will be a key of unsealing, that is, we can apply λk : α ℓ . v to K and get the sealed value v. The existence of such a typable term K of α ℓ in λ → corresponds to a user's authority to unseal with ℓ in λ [ ] . Our translation is full and, hence, there is no problem to prove noninterference property of λ [ ] under Tse-Zdancewic's scenario described above.
Our main technical contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Development of a sound and fully complete translation from λ [ ] to λ → ;
• A proof of the noninterference theorem of λ [ ] by reduction to the basic lemma of λ → ; and • A proof of equivalence between λ [ ] and DCC pc . As for DCC, noninterference can be proved directly by straightforward induction in a manner quite similar to the basic lemma of λ → . So, the main interest would not be in the noninterference property itself but, rather, in how semantics of different calculi can be related with each other by translation. The existence of a fully complete translation means that λ [ ] provides syntax rich enough to express every denotation in the model (that is, λ → ). The translation is also fully abstract, as our logical relation for λ [ ] coincides with its contextual equivalence. Also, comparing Tse-Zdancewic's translation of DCC with ours, we have found and show that, in spite of simplification, λ [ ] is actually equivalent to DCC pc mentioned above. This result indicates that both calculi are really improvements over DCC.
This article is an extended version of our previous paper [19] . In addition to giving detailed proofs, we have extended the earlier version of λ [ ] by introducing ordering on levels, as DCC or DCC pc , making it easier to compare λ [ ] with them.
Structure of the Paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces λ [ ] with its syntax, type system, reduction, and logical relations and then the statement of the noninterference theorem. In Sections 3 and 4 we introduce λ → and define a translation from λ [ ] to λ → and its inverse. In Section 5, we complete our proof of noninterference by reducing it to the basic lemma of logical relations for λ → . Section 6 explains why Tse and Zdancewic's translation from DCC to System F is neither full nor sound, introduces their extension DCC pc , which recovers fullness, and shows that λ [ ] and DCC pc are equivalent. Finally, Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
Sealing Calculus
In this section, we define λ [ ] , which is the simply typed λ-calculus with sealing. First, we will introduce two kinds of levels: data levels and observer levels. Intuitively, a data level represents a degree of confidentiality of data, while an observer level represents a capability of an observer (e.g., a user or a process) to access data. The observer can access only data whose data level ℓ is lower than (i.e., inside of the range of) his or her observer level π. Moreover, he or she can just obtain information depending on such data.
Then, we will define the terms, type systems, and reduction semantics of λ [ ] and show some basic properties. As mentioned in the previous section, we write [e] ℓ for sealing a λ [ ] term e with a data level ℓ. The sealed value can be extracted by unsealing e ℓ , whose result must not be leaked to any observer whose observer level is not higher than ℓ. We control such dependency by the type system. In this system, information on the data level ℓ used for sealing is attached to types of sealing [t] ℓ ; furthermore, type judgments, written Γ ; π − e : t, are augmented by an observer level π, which is also called a protection context elsewhere [22, 23, 21] , as well as by a typing context Γ, which is a (finite) mapping from variables to types. This judgment means that the value of e has type t as usual and, moreover, can be leaked to (any observer at) an observer level higher than π.
Finally, we will formalize equivalences for λ [ ] and give the formal statement of noninterference. The equivalences are indexed by observer levels. In the definition, any two values sealed at the same data level will always be considered equal, or indistinguishable, unless the observer level is higher than the data level; and then the noninterference amounts to saying that, given inputs equal at a given observer level, a typable program yields equal outputs (at the same level). So, in other words, an observer level reflects how much power one has to distinguish the extensional behavior of programs by investigating the contents of (sealed) values returned by the programs.
2.1. Syntax. Let (L, ⊑) be a poset where L is a finite set of data levels, ranged over by ℓ, and ⊑ is a partial order over L. The metavariable π ranges over observer levels, which are finite subsets of data levels. We will often omit the qualifications "data" and "observer" for levels unless there is no confusion. Observer levels are pre-ordered as follows: π 1 ⊑ π 2 if and only if, for any ℓ 1 ∈ π 1 , there exists ℓ 2 ∈ π 2 such that ℓ 1 ⊑ ℓ 2 . We also abbreviate {ℓ} ⊑ π to ℓ ⊑ π.
Remark 2.1. The notions of authorities and levels in the early version of this article [19] correspond to those of data and observer levels here. A main difference is that authorities were not given an order but data levels are partially ordered as in DCC. We have changed them to follow the standard terminology but also introduce an explicit distinction between two kinds of levels-those of data and those of observers. Remark 2.2. We could unify data and observer levels and use a lattice, which is more standard in security calculi [1, 7] , to define λ [ ] , just as in (precisely speaking, an earlier version [22, 23] of) Tse and Zdancewic's extension of DCC. Nevertheless, we adopt a poset for data levels and the pre-ordered set induced from it for observer levels, because it would be rather complicated (and also tedious) to translate such a variant into λ → . Note that the observer levels can be viewed as a lattice by identifying any two elements that are greater than each other.
Then, the types of λ [ ] are defined as follows. Definition 2.3 (Types). The set of types, ranged over by t, t ′ , t 1 , t 2 , . . . , is defined as follows:
We define the terms of λ [ ] below. The metavariables x, y, and z (possibly with subscripts) range over the denumerable set of variables. Definition 2.4 (Terms). The set of terms, ranged over by e, e ′ , e 1 , e 2 , . . . , is defined as follows:
Terms of λ [ ] include variable, the unit value, λ-abstraction, application, pairing, projection, injection, and case analysis. As usual, x is bound in e of λx : t. e and x 1 and x 2 are bound in e 1 and e 2 of (case e 0 of ι 1 (x 1 ).e 1 | ι 2 (x 2 ).e 2 ), respectively. We say, for [e] ℓ , e is sealed at ℓ, and call [e] ℓ and e ℓ a sealing term and an unsealing term, respectively. In this paper, α-conversions are defined in a customary manner and implicit α-conversions are assumed to make all the bound variables distinct from other (bound and free) variables.
2.2. Type System. As mentioned above, the form of type judgment of λ [ ] is Γ ; π − e : t. This judgment is read as "e is given type t at observer level π under context Γ." The intuition is that the computation of e depends on only data levels lower than π, and so the information on its value can be leaked only to an observer level π ′ , which is higher than π.
The typing rules of λ [ ] are given as follows:
N. SHIKUMA AND A. IGARASHI
All the rules but the last two are straightforward. The rule (ST-Seal) for sealing means that, by sealing with ℓ, it is legal to leak [e] ℓ to an observer level which is not higher than ℓ: at such an observer level, however, e cannot be unsealed, as is shown in the rule (ST-Unseal) for unsealing.
Example 2.5. The following judgment
is derivable if and only if ℓ 1 ⊑ π ∪ {ℓ 2 }, which is required at unsealing x of [t 1 + t 2 ] ℓ 1 with ℓ 1 -the observer level there is π ∪ {ℓ 2 } and must be higher than the data level ℓ 1 .
The type constructor [·] ℓ is very similar to the (indexed) monadic type constructor T ℓ in DCC [1] . In fact, the logical relations we will define for λ [ ] are essentially the same as those defined for DCC and a main idea of the translation from λ [ ] to λ → is also the same as that from DCC to System F [21, 22, 23] . Nevertheless, we have chosen a different symbol as the monadic bind construct is no longer used in λ [ ] and, as a result, the type system is fairly different from DCC. We will give a more detailed comparison with DCC (and its extension [21, 22, 23] Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ; π 1 − e : t, using the fact that
Lemma 2.7 (Substitution Property). If Γ ; π − e : t and Γ, x : t ; π − e ′ : t ′ , then
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ, x : t ; π − e ′ : t ′ , using Lemma 2.6.
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The following three theorems are standard.
Theorem 2.8 (Subject Reduction). If Γ ; π − e : t and e −→ e ′ , then Γ ; π − e ′ : t.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ; π − e : t, using Lemmas 2.6 and 2.7.
Theorem 2.9 (Strong Normalization). If Γ ; π − e : t, then e is strongly normalizing, that is, there is no infinite sequence of reductions which starts from e.
Proof. Define a translation from λ [ ] into the simply typed λ-calculus as follows:
This translation preserves typing and maps a reduction e 1 −→ e 2 to e * 1 −→ + e * 2 , where −→ + is the transitive closure of −→. So, from strong normalization for the simply typed λ-calculus (see, e.g., [9] ), we conclude one for
Theorem 2.10 (Church-Rosser Property). If Γ ; π − e : t and e −→ * e 1 and e −→ * e 2 , then there exists a term e ′ such that e i −→ * e ′ (i = 1, 2).
Proof. By Theorem 2.9 and Newman's Lemma [13] , it suffices to show that the reduction is weakly confluent: If Γ ; π − e : t and e −→ e 1 and e −→ e 2 , then there exists a term e ′ such that e i −→ * e ′ (i = 1, 2). This is easy.
2.5. Contextual Equivalence, Noninterference, and Logical Relations. Now we formalize equivalence of terms from the viewpoint of an observer at a given level as contextual equivalence, and then state a formalization of noninterference.
We say that e 1 and e 2 are contextually equivalent at observer level π if C[e 1 ] and C[e 2 ] are evaluated to the same value for any context C[·] typed at π. Note that the equivalence is indexed by an observer level. We define contextual equivalence ctx = π as follows:
. Assume that · ; π − e i : t for i = 1, 2 (we write · for the empty variable context). The relation e 1 ctx = π e 2 : t is defined by: e 1 ctx = π e 2 : t if and only if f e 1 nf = f e 2 for any f such that · ; π − f : t → bool. Here, e nf = e ′ means that e and e ′ have the same normal form and bool stands for unit + unit.
Here we use functions as contexts without loss of generality, because, by Strong Normalization and Church-Rosser, C[e] and (λx : t. C[x]) e has a unique normal form, where t is the type of e.
The following proposition shows that an observer level in the contextual equivalence reflects an observer's distinguishability, in other words, that an observer at a lower level can distinguish no more terms than another at a higher. Proof. Take a function f such that · ; π 1 − f : t → bool. By Observer Level Monotonicity (Proposition 2.6), · ; π 2 − f : t → bool and · ; π 2 − e i : t (i = 1, 2). By assumption, f e 1 nf = f e 2 , and so e 1 ctx = π 1 e 2 : t. We use γ to represent a simultaneous substitution of terms for variables and write γ 1
Then, the noninterference is defined as follows: Definition 2.13 (Noninterference). Take e such that Γ ; π − e : t. The well typed term e satisfies noninterference, if and only if, γ 1 (e) ctx = π γ 2 (e) : t for any γ 1 and γ 2 such that
As mentioned before, noninterference means that, for any pair of program inputs that are equivalent from the viewpoint of an observer at some security level, the outputs are also equivalent for the observer. Here, substitutions γ 1 and γ 2 play roles of equivalent inputs to program e. So, this property specifies the correctness of the type system as a dependency analysis.
Though we want to show that any well typed term satisfies the noninterference above, this is hard due to the following generally-known fact: it is difficult, in general, to show given two terms are contextually equivalent. The reason is that we must take account of all contexts but proof by induction on the structure of contexts does not usually work.
To solve this problem, we use the well-known technique of logical relations [9, 14] , which will be shown to be equivalent to the contextual equivalences, and state the noninterference theorem in terms of the logical relations.
As the contextual equivalence above, the logical relations (for close terms and closed normal forms) are indexed by observer levels as well as types. A judgment e 1 ≈ π e 2 : t means that closed terms e 1 and e 2 of type t are logically related at observer level π. Similarly, v 1 ∼ π v 2 : t means that closed normal forms v 1 and v 2 of t are logically related at π. We assume · ; π − e i : t and · ; π − v i : t for i = 1, 2.
Definition 2.14 (Logical Relations for λ [ ] ). The relations v 1 ∼ π v 2 : t and e 1 ≈ π e 2 : t are defined by the following rules:
Most rules are straightforward. In the rule (SL-Fun), the premise is the abbreviation of the following: ∀e 1 . ∀e 2 . e 1 ≈ π e 2 : t 1 ⇒ v 1 e 1 ≈ π v 2 e 2 : t 2 . There are two rules for
, so these sealing terms are equivalent only when its contents are equivalent. Otherwise, the observer cannot distinguish them at all and those terms are always regarded equivalent.
Example 2.15. We write true and false, respectively, for ι 1 (()) and ι 2 (()). Let L and H data levels and suppose that L is strictly lower than H. Take We define γ 1 ≈ π γ 2 : Γ similarly to γ 1 ctx = π γ 2 : Γ. Then, the noninterference theorem is stated as follows:
We will give a proof in Section 5. 
So, by (SL-Seal2), c 1 = c 2 , which means that f always returns a constant value.
Also, from the noninterference theorem (Theorem 2.16), it follows that the logical relations exactly coincide with the contextual equivalences above, and hence, in terms of the latter as well as the former, the noninterference theorem also holds. Proof. First, we show the right from the left. Suppose that e 1 ≈ π e 2 : t. Take arbitrary f such that · ; π − f : t → bool. By Noninterference Theorem, f ≈ π f : t → bool, and by (SL-Term) and (SL-Fun), f e 1 ≈ π f e 2 : bool. By (SL-Term), (SL-Inj) and (SL-Unit), f e 1 nf = f e 2 and hence e 1 ctx = π e 2 : t. Next, we prove the converse above by induction on the structure of t. Assume that e 1 ctx = π e 2 : t. We show only the main cases:
. Take arbitrary e ′ 1 and e ′ 2 such that e ′ 1 ≈ π e ′ 2 : t 1 . By the leftto-right of Theorem 2.18 (which has been already shown in the first part of this proof), (Otherwise, there would be a term f such that · ; π − f : 
The Simply Typed λ-calculus
We review the simply typed λ-calculus λ → briefly with logical relations for it.
3.1. Definition of λ → . λ → introduced here is a standard one with unit, base, function, product, and sum types. We assume that base types, written α ℓ (ℓ ∈ L), have one-to-one correspondence with data levels. We use metavariables M for terms and A for types. The syntax of λ → is given as follows:
Note that base type α ℓ has neither constants nor closed terms. The reason is that, as mentioned in Section 1, we will use a term of type α ℓ as a key for opening a sealing at level ℓ and such a key should be permitted only to privileged users. See Section 4 for details. The form of type judgment of λ → is ∆ − M : A, where ∆ is a (finite) mapping from variables to λ → types. The typing rules are given as follows:
The reduction of λ → terms consists of standard β-reduction
and the following commutative conversion.
As in λ [ ] , the reduction for λ → is full, too. Here, we write FV(M ) for the set of free variables in M . In what follows, we use V for normal forms. For example, by the first and second commutative conversion rules,
which is a normal form.
The resulting calculus (with commutative conversion) satisfies the standard properties of subject reduction, Church-Rosser, and strong normalization [2] . We say (the type derivation ∆ − M : A of) a term satisfies the subformula property when any type in the derivation is a subexpression of either A or a type occurring in ∆. Then, any well typed term can reduce to the one that satisfies the subformula property as in the theorem below, which makes it easy to ensure the fullness of the translation. of type unit + unit → unit would be a normal form, which does not satisfy the subformula property, because a subterm λy : unit. () has type unit → unit, which does not occur in unit + unit → unit. This theorem also requires full reduction, which allows any redex (even under λ) to reduce.
As mentioned above, we will view terms of type α ℓ as keys. What really matters in the development below is whether any key of a given type exists or not and it is is not significant what kind of keys exist. Thus we identify all keys by introducing a (typed) equivalence relation ∆ − M 1 ≡ M 2 : A.
A is defined as the least relation closed under the rules below:
The rule (A-Key) signifies that all keys are identified. Proof. Easy.
The following lemma says that two terms which differ only in subterms of type α ℓ are equivalent via ≡. 
The rule (LL-KT) corresponds to (A-Key) and means that the number of keys to open a sealing with ℓ is at most one. Although we could give a more general definition of syntactic logical relations, where the relation for type α ℓ is parameterized, and prove the basic lemma for them below, but, in this paper, we do not need such general settings and just take the restricted version above for simplicity. We write δ for a simultaneous substitution of λ → terms for variables and
Then, the basic lemma is as follows:
For later use, we will prove a little generalized lemma as below, from which the basic lemma above follows by reflexivity of ≡ (Lemma 3.4).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∆ − M 1 ≡ M 2 : A. We show only the main cases. Below, we write δ ′ 1 ⊎ δ ′ 2 for the union of two disjoint substitutions δ ′ 1 and
. Case (the last rule of the derivation is (A-Key)). Then, the last step of the derivation has a form ∆ − M 1 :
α ℓ and A = α ℓ . By Substitution Property, Strong Normalization and Subject Reduction, there
Case (the last rule of the derivation is (A-Abs)). Then, the last step of the derivation has a form ∆, x :
Case (the last rule of the derivation is (A-App)). Then, the last step of the derivation has a form 
Translation
In this section, we define a formal translation from λ [ ] to λ → and its inverse. Both translations are shown to preserve typing.
From λ
One of the main ideas of the translation, which closely follows Tse and Zdancewic's translation from DCC to System F [22, 23] , is to translate sealing of type [t] ℓ to a function from the base type α ℓ , which corresponds to ℓ. The sealed value can be extracted by passing a term of α ℓ as an argument. Intuitively, the term of α ℓ serves as a "key" for unsealing. 
where op stands for →, ×, or +. (·) † is extended pointwise to contexts by:
Before describing the details of the translation, we give an example for readers to grasp its intuition.
The first and last variable declarations are respectively translated results of x : [bool] L and the observer level H. The unsealing x L is translated into the application of x to c HL k H which corresponds to a key for the unsealing, and where c HL coerces the key k H for the observer level H to that for L. This coercion is declared at the second last variable declaration. The other variables c LL and c HH are trivial coercions.
Let c be an injective partial map from pairs of levels to variables such that c ℓ 2 ℓ 1 is defined if and only if ℓ 1 ⊑ ℓ 2 . We take a finite mapping C ⊑ = {c ℓ 2 ℓ 1 : α ℓ 2 → α ℓ 1 | ℓ 1 ⊑ ℓ 2 } from variables to types, which corresponds to the variable declarations
Each variable c ℓ 2 ℓ 1 represents a function to coerce a key for a higher level to that for a lower. As like above, C ⊑ will be included in a variable context for typing the translated terms. Note that, if we let L be infinite, the domain of C ⊑ would be so, too, and hence we would have to extend the type judgments of λ → to allow an infinite context. Such an extension would be easy since only a finite number of variables can be used in a term.
The translation of λ [ ] to λ → is represented by Γ; σ − e : t ց M , read "λ [ ] term e of type t is translated to M under Γ and σ," where σ is an injective finite map from data levels to variables. In the example above, σ is {H → k H }. This mapping σ, whose domain represents the observer level at which the λ [ ] term is typed, records correspondence between the data levels included in the observer level and variables that are used as keys. When typing the translated term in λ → , those variables are declared in the variable context (e.g., k H : α H in Example 4.2), and hence, from usual conventions of λ → , we assume that the range of σ and the domains of Γ and C ⊑ are pairwise disjoint and that we can implicitly rename variables in the range of σ, so that choices for key names do not matter. 
Here, we write σ{ℓ → k} for a mapping from dom(σ) ∪ {ℓ} to variables defined by: σ{ℓ → k}(ℓ) = k; and σ{ℓ → k}(ℓ ′ ) = σ(ℓ ′ ) if ℓ = ℓ ′ . Note that ℓ may occur in the domain of σ.
The translation of terms is easily derived from the translation rules for types. In the last rule (Tr-Unseal), a key for opening the sealing is obtained from σ and a coercion-if e ℓ is well typed at the observer level represented by dom(σ), then ℓ should be lower than dom(σ) and hence a coercion function should exist in C ⊑ to provide a key of ℓ.
Example 4.4. Let L and H 1 and H 2 be data levels and suppose that L is strictly lower than both H 1 and H 2 . We can translate
Well typed λ [ ] terms can be translated to well typed λ → terms as in the theorem below. Here, we write σ † for the context defined by: {σ(ℓ) : α ℓ | ℓ ∈ dom(σ)}. Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ; π − e : t. We show only the main cases:
Case (the last rule of the derivation is (ST-Seal)). Then, e = [e 0 ] ℓ and t = [t 0 ] ℓ for some e 0 and t 0 . Take a fresh variable k such that ran(σ{ℓ → k}) ∩ dom(Γ) = ∅. By the induction hypothesis, there exists M 0 such that Γ; σ{ℓ → k} − e 0 : t 0 ց M 0 and
by (LT-Abs) and weakening.
Case (the last rule of the derivation is (ST-Unseal)). Then, e = e ℓ 0 for some e 0 . By the induction hypothesis, there exists M 0 such that Γ;
The other cases are similar.
Note that, as we have seen in Example 4.4, the translation result might not be unique since there might be many keys to be coerced to one for some observer level in applying (Tr-Unseal). In fact, if we can translate an unsealing term with some key included in σ, where another higher key exists, then, another translation is also possible by using the latter key instead of the former one, which may be removed from σ. This fact is generalized as follows. Proof. By induction on the size of the derivation of Γ; σ{ℓ 1 → k 1 } − e : t ց M. Note that every occurrence of k 1 in M appears as c ℓ 1 ℓ k 1 for some ℓ, since k 1 is always introduced by (Tr-Unseal). Because σ has the higher key of α ℓ 2 than k 1 , we can replace all the c ℓ 1 ℓ k 1 and remove all the occurrences of k 1 . The last equivalence follows from (A-Key).
We define the inverse translation, represented by Γ; σ − M ր e : t. It is read "λ → term M of type t † under Γ † and C ⊑ and σ † is translated back to a λ [ ] term e." Definition 4.7 (Inverse Translation). The relation Γ; σ − M ր e : t is defined as the least relation closed by the following rules:
In the rule (ITr-Seal2), since we equate keys for the same data level by (A-Key) and (LL-KT), we can replace the key σ(ℓ) by another k. Note that, even if Γ † , C ⊑ , σ † − M : t † , the inverse translation of M is not always possible. However, we can give a sufficient condition for the inverse translation to exist and show that the inverse translation also preserves typing: Proof. By induction on the size of the derivation of Γ † , C ⊑ , σ † − M : t † . We show only the main cases:
Case (the last rule of the derivation is (LT-Abs)). Then, the last step of the derivation has a form
We have three subcases:
, all the subderivations of which also satisfy Subformula Property. So, by the induction hypothesis, there exists e 0 such that Γ, x : t 1 ; dom(σ) − e 0 : t 2 and Γ, x : t 1 ; σ − M 0 ր e 0 : t 2 . Hence, Γ ; dom(σ) − λx : t 1 . e 0 : t 1 → t 2 and Γ; σ − λx : A 1 . M 0 ր λx : t 1 . e 0 : t 1 → t 2 .
0 , all the subderivations of which also satisfy Subformula Property. So, by the induction hypothesis, there exists e 0 such that Γ ; dom(σ{ℓ → x}) − e 0 : t 0 and Γ; σ{ℓ → x} − M 0 ր e 0 : t 0 . Since ℓ ∈ dom(σ) and Case (the last rule of the derivation is (LT-App)). Then, the last step of the derivation has a form 
So, it follows that Γ ; dom(σ) − e ℓ : t and Γ; σ − M 1 M 2 ր e ℓ : t by (ST-Unseal) and (ITr-Unseal).
By the induction hypotheses, we can easily show the conclusion.
For the cases where the last rule of the derivation is an elimination of a product or sum type, the proof is similar to the case of application. The rest of the proof is easy.
Remark 4.9. In the above theorem, Subformula Property gives a sufficient condition to exclude "junk" terms such as (λx : α ℓ → α ℓ . ())(λk : α ℓ . k). Since λk : α ℓ . k has type α ℓ → α ℓ , no rules of inverse translation can be applied and the inverse translation will fail. Its derivation, however, does not satisfy Subformula Property, so this is not a counterexample for the theorem above. (In fact, its normal form can be translated back to a λ [ ] term.) Example 4.10. We use the same settings as Example 4.4.
Proof of Noninterference via Preservation of Logical Relations
In this section, we give an indirect proof of the noninterference theorem, which is obtained as an easy corollary of the theorem that the translation is sound and complete, that is, the logical relation for λ [ ] is preserved and reflected by the translation to λ → . The properties we would expect are If ·; σ − e i : t ց M i for i = 1, 2 and e 1 ≈ dom(σ) e 2 : t, then C ⊑ , σ † − M 1 ≈ M 2 : t † , and its converse
It is not very easy, however, to prove them directly because logical relations are defined by induction on types whereas the translations are not. Thus, following Tse and Zdancewic [21, 22, 23] , we introduce another logical relation (called logical correspondence) e ; ;σ M : t over terms of λ [ ] and λ → , then prove that it includes (the graphs of) the translations of both directions (Theorems 5.4 and 5.6). Then, after showing that the logical correspondence is full (Corollary 5.7), we finally prove preservation of logical relations by logical correspondence and reduce the noninterference theorem to Basic Lemma (Lemma 3.8).
Logical Correspondence and Its Fullness.
Definition 5.1 (Logical Correspondence). The relations e ; ;σ M : t and v ; σ V : t, where we assume that · ; dom(σ) − e : t and · ; dom(σ) − v : t and C ⊑ , σ † − M : t † and C ⊑ , σ † − V : t † , are defined as the least relation closed under the following rules:
Intuitively, e ; ;σ M : t means that e and M exhibit the same behavior from the viewpoint of an observer at dom(σ). The rule (C-Seal) for [t] ℓ expresses the fact that the existence of well typed M of α ℓ under C ⊑ and σ † is equivalent to the fact that the level ℓ is lower than dom(σ). In other words, if ℓ is not lower than dom(σ), the premise is vacuously true, representing that the observer cannot distinguish anything. 
So, by the induction hypothesis, γ(e 0 ) ; ;σ δ(M ′ 0 ) : t 0 . Also, by Lemma 3.9,
, and, applying Theorem 5.3, we get γ(e 0 ) ; ;σ δ(λk :
Case (the last translation rule of the derivation is (Tr-Unseal)). Assume that the last step of the derivation has a form
By the induction hypothesis, γ(e 1 ) ; ;σ δ(M 
Since γ(e ℓ 1 ) and δ(M 1 (c ℓ ′ ℓ σ(ℓ ′ ))) respectively have the same normal forms as v and
It is slightly harder to show that the logical correspondence includes the graphs of the inverse translation, since the inverse translation is not quite a (right) inverse of the translation to λ → : The inverse translation followed by the forward translation may yield a term different from the original (see Examples 4.4 and 4.10). Fortunately, the difference is only slight: They differ only in subterms of base types α ℓ and are equivalent via ≡, thus logically related by Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 5.5. If Γ † , C ⊑ , σ † − M : t † and Γ; σ − M ր e : t and Γ; σ − e : t ց M ′ , then
Remark 6.1. DCC pc was proposed [22, 23] and simplified later by Tse and Zdancewic [21] . In this paper, we use the simplified version with the following changes:
• We split the single typing rule for bind into the two rules.
• We add the rule (D-Protected) above for the subject reduction property, which does not really hold in the original formulation, due to the reduction of bind. 
(For other type constructors, both translations are trivial.) At the term level, (·) • is obvious-sealing and unsealing can be straightforwardly expressed by η ℓ and bind, respectively:
The translation (·) • for terms is more involved. A main difficulty is in the bind operator. At first one might think bind x = e 1 in e 2 can be expressed by (λx.e • 2 ) (e • 1 ) ℓ , but, if Γ ; π − DCCpc bind x = e 1 in e 2 : t 2 is derived by (D-Bind2), where ℓ ⊑ π and ℓ t 2 , then (e • 1 ) ℓ is typable only at π ∪ {ℓ}, which is strictly higher than π; so is (λx.e • 2 ) (e • 1 ) ℓ . Thus, this naive translation does not quite preserve typing. This problem is solved by observing that t 2 is protected at ℓ (i.e., ℓ t 2 ). First, we can seal (λx.e • 2 ) (e • 1 ) ℓ and derive
Here, this sealing with ℓ is redundant since t 2 is already protected by ℓ. In fact, we can always eliminate such a sealing by applying an anti-protection combinator, defined below, of type [t 2 ] ℓ → t 2 . Definition 6.2 (Anti-Protection Combinators). The set of closed terms P ℓ t indexed by protected types is inductively defined as follows: Proof. By induction of the derivation of ℓ t.
The second clause means that no term of a protected type illegally leak any information. A corresponding property has been proved for DCC [1] . Now we return to defining (·) • . For the bind operator, we have two cases. (Strictly speaking, (·) • is defined by induction on the type derivation as in Section 4.) If the last typing rule is (D-Bind1), the definition is just (bind x = e 1 in e 2 )
• def = (λx. e where e 1 and e 2 have types T ℓ t 1 and t 2 , respectively. If it is (D-Bind2), we can assume ℓ t 2 and (bind x = e 1 in e 2 )
• def = P ℓ t 2 [(λx. e
• 2 ) (e
Another interesting case is when the last step of the type derivation is Γ ; π ∪ {ℓ} − DCCpc e : t ℓ ⊑ π ℓ t Γ ; π − DCCpc e : t (D-Protected)
The situation is similar to the case for (D-Bind2): the DCC pc type t is already protected at ℓ and so ℓ in the context of the premise is redundant. So, we obtain P ℓ t [e • ] ℓ , in which e • is the translation from Γ ; π ∪ {ℓ} − DCC pc e : t. For the other typing rules, the translation is trivial. For example, (η ℓ e)
• def
Clearly, both translations preserve typing. The following theorem ensures that the translations preserve the logical relations, showing DCC pc and λ [ ] are equivalent. 
Theorem 6.4 (Preservation of Equivalences

Conclusion
We have formalized noninterference for a typed λ-calculus λ [ ] by logical relations and proved it by reducing it to the basic lemma of logical relation for λ → through a translation of λ [ ] to λ → . Moreover, we have shown that λ [ ] is equivalent to DCC pc , an extension of DCC with observer levels, as illustrated in Figure 1 : a dotted double arrow stands for a language extension and the two systems (except DCC) in the dashed box have sound and fully complete translations into λ → . In those systems, dependency is captured by typability in λ → through the translations.
There have been presented many ways to prove noninterference theorems for typebased dependency analyses for higher-order languages. For example, Heintze and Riecke [7] and Abadi et al. [1] showed the noninterference theorem for SLam by using denotational semantics. Pottier and Simonet [15] proved it for Core ML with non-standard operational semantics. Miyamoto and Igarashi [10] , in the study of a modal typed calculus λ 2 s , showed that the noninterference theorem for certain types can be easily proved only by using a simple nondeterministic reduction system, although this system does not include recursion unlike the others mentioned here.
In comparison with these proofs, the proof technique presented in this paper might seem overwhelming to show only noninterference. Nevertheless, we believe it is still theoretically interesting since the translation shows that the notion of dependency can be captured only in terms of simple types and makes a comparison between type-based dependency analyses easier.
Practically, the translation might be a basis for implementing a language with sealing by another language without it. However, our results rely on full reduction with commuting conversions, or strong normalization, which cannot be assumed in real languages. So, it would be interesting future work to investigate how this proof technique may be extended to richer languages with, for example, recursion. To add recursion, several difficulties have to be overcome. A first problem, as is already pointed out by Tse and Zdancewic [21, 22, 23] , is that a key of any data level can be "forged" by using recursion, which allows a term of any type, and such forged keys enable any observer to extract a sealed value illegally. As suggested also by Tse and Zdancewic, this problem may be solved by pointed types (or use of Haskell's seq). A second, more serious problem is that it would be much harder to give an inverse translation: if the translation is extended in a straightforward manner, then there will be "junk" terms, such as some divergent terms not in the image of the translation and, as a result, fullness would be lost. We expect some more significant work will be needed to solve these problems.
